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L INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff-appellant, Bonnie Tingey, submits this Brief in reply to the
Brief of defendants-appellees, LuAnn Christensen and Barr Christensen.
Ms. Tingey stands by her legal analysis, and its application to the instant dispute, set
forth in her Opening Brief. She seeks to refrain from unnecessarily repeating the
arguments, regarding the correctness of which she remains confident, that are set
forth in that Opening Brief.
II. ARGUMENT
A.

The Christensens are in error in their statement, appearing on

page 1 of their Brief, that the applicable standard of appellate review, for both of
the issues presented by Ms. Tingey in this appeal, is one of abuse of discretion.
That standard applies to the district court's denial of Ms. Tingey's Motion for New
Trial, but it does not apply to her contention that the district court committed
reversible error when it refused to give her proposed jury instruction that is at issue.
The standard that governs that issue is, as pointed out in Ms. Tingey's Opening
Brief, a de novo standard, inasmuch as the question is one of law.
B.

The record is clear, contrary to the Christensens' statement at

page 2 of their Brief, that the Christensens conceded that the negligence of LuAnn
Christensen caused Ms. Tingey to suffer some damages. See transcript of
March 13, 1996 proceedings at 193. Also, the Special Verdict form utilized by the
l

district court (R. at 268) does not include the usual question dealing with proximate
cause.
C.

The Christensens erroneously rely, at page 5 of their Brief and

elsewhere, on the fact that Ms. Tingey had been involved in prior vehicular
collisions. Ms. Tingey freely presented evidence of those earlier accidents, in her
case in chief, and has never denied that she sustained injuries in two of those
previous accidents. Neither the fact that she had had such an unfortunate history
nor the fact that she was still suffering significantly from some of those injuries at
the time of the subject incident undermines any of her arguments on appeal. A jury
conclusion, without evidentiary basis, that an already injured person cannot
experience exacerbation of symptoms in a subsequent incident would be patently
irrational. The fact of those previous injuries and the fact of her ongoing problems
at the time of the subject incident were likely of great significance to the jury, and
the Christensens played those cards for all they were worth and more, but those
facts do not render either of Ms. Tingey's arguments on appeal insignificant or
unworthy of being treated on its merits.
D,

The Christensens make reference, at pages 6-7 of their Brief, to

the fact that there was no visible damage to the Tingey vehicle from the subject
incident. No witness testified that there is, as a general proposition, any connection
between vehicular damage and personal injury, and no witness testified that, on the
2

facts of this case, there was any such connection.
E.

The Christensens make reference, at pages 6-7 of their Brief, to

evidence supportive of the proposition that Ms. Tingey's temporomandibular joint
problem (for which she unquestionably underwent unquestionably necessary surgery)
may not have been caused by the subject incident. The testimony of the
Christensens' witnesses Walker and McClellan dealt with that (the "TMJ") aspect of
Ms. Tingey's claims. Noticeably absent from the Christensens' Brief is the recitation
of any evidence supporting the proposition that her pre-existing musculoskeletal
problems were not exacerbated by the subject incident.
F.

The Christensens deal, at page 7 of their Brief, with

Ms. Tingey's claimed foot injury. Because Ms. Tingey is not pursuing that aspect
of her claims in this appeal, the Court should ascribe no import to that part of the
Christensens' analysis.
G.

The Christensens point out, at page 8 of their Brief, that there is

no indication that the low verdict was a product of passion or prejudice. Because
Ms. Tingey is not pursuing any Rule 59(a)(5) "passion or prejudice" claim in this
appeal, the Court should accord no import to that part of the Christensens' analysis
but should review the verdict only, for Rule 59(a) purposes, under the
"insufficiency-of-the evidence" prong of Rule 59(a)(6), and should, as suggested
hereinabove and in the papers submitted by Ms. Tingey in connection with the
3

proceedings having to do with her Petition for Writ of Certiorari, focus that part of
its analysis on the evidence (substantial portions of which are reproduced in the
Addendum to her Opening Brief) dealing with the question of exacerbation of her
pre-existing conditions.
H.

The Christensens claim, at page 8 of their Brief: "The evidence

was definitely in conflict as to which accident caused [Ms. Tingey's] alleged
injuries." As pointed out by Ms. Tingey in her Opening Brief and in the papers she
submitted in connection with her request for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, the
fact of the matter is that the evidence that the subject incident exacerbated her preincident musculoskeletal conditions was essentially uncontroverted.
I.

Perhaps the most significant weakness of the Christensens'

position is manifested by their Briefs failure to effectively address the district
court's refusal to give Ms. Tingey's proposed jury instruction No. 27 (reproduced at
p. 60 of the Addendum to Ms. Tingey's Opening Brief), an instruction that, again,
the Christensens had themselves in substance proposed (see p. 61 of that Addendum). The instruction in question, dealing with issues of proof and jury duty in
personal injury cases dealing with alleged aggravation of pre-existing conditions, is
one that courts of numerous jurisdictions have approved. The Christensens have
cited no authority contrary to those discussed in her Opening Brief at pages 42-44
(see, especially, footnotes 8 and 9 appearing on those pages). This Court should
4

rule that, in circumstances such as those applicable to the instant dispute, a plaintiff
is entitled to such an instruction and that the district court committed reversible
error when it refused to give Ms. Tingey's proposed instruction on the issue.
Contrary to the Christensens' contention, the standard "aggravation-of-existingcondition" MUJI instruction did not sufficiently advise the jury on the common law
dealing with that issue, and, on the facts of this case, the district court's omission of
Ms. Tingey's proposed instruction did mislead the jury to Ms. Tingey's prejudice.
m.

CONCLUSION

Based on this Reply Brief and on the points and authorities brought to
the Court's attention in her Opening Brief and the Addendum thereto, Ms. Tingey
urges the Court to reverse and remand for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ZiMlay of October, 1998.

PETER C. COLLINS
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.
Attorneys for Bonnie K. Tingey
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